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Abstract. Statistical comparisons of electoral variables are made be-
tween groups of electronic voting machines and voting centers classified
by types of transmissions according to the volume of traffic in incoming
and outgoing data of machines from and toward the National Electoral
Council (CNE) totalizing servers. One unexpectedly finds two types of
behavior in wire telephony data transmissions and only one type where
cellular telephony is employed, contravening any reasonable electoral
normative. Differentiation in data transmissions arise when comparing
number of incoming and outgoing data bytes per machine against to-
tal number of votes per machine reported officially by the CNE. The
respective distributions of electoral variables for each type of transmis-
sion show that the groups classified by it do not correspond to random
sets of the electoral universe. In particular, the distributions for the NO
percentage of votes per machine differ statistically across groups. The
presidential elections of 1998, 2000 and the 2004 Presidential Recall
Referendum (2004 PRR) are compared according to the type of trans-
missions in 2004 PRR. Statistically, the difference between the empir-
ical distributions of the 2004 PRR NO results and the 2000 Chavez
votes results by voting centers is not significant.
Key words and phrases: Electronic voting, electoral data transmis-
sion, recall referendum, Venezuelan elections.
1. INTRODUCTION
During the Venezuelan Presidential Recall Ref-
erendum (PRR) held on August 15 of 2004, vot-
ers used electronic voting machines to cast their
votes. A NO or YES vote meant a pro-government
or anti-government vote respectively. In order to
investigate the trustworthiness of the electoral re-
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sults, we carry out a forensic analysis of the gov-
ernment official National Electoral Council (CNE)
electoral results transmitted by machines nation-
wide and of data contained in Remote Authentica-
tion Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) logs of trans-
missions produced by authentication, authorization
and accounting (AAA) servers used in wire and cel-
lular transmissions between voting machines and to-
talizing servers [2–4].
While in this paper we only explore transmission
data collected during the Venezuelan PRR of 2004,
some of the methods presented here can be applied
in different contexts. In particular, the discussion in
the manuscript can inform governments and other
international organizations who wish to plan elec-
toral audits in the future, in Venezuela or elsewhere.
Given the increasing popularity of electronic voting
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machines world-wide, the development of monitor-
ing and auditing methods to guarantee the reliabil-
ity of electronic voting processes is critically impor-
tant.
Transmission data correspond only to communi-
cations through wire and cellular (mobile) telephony
but cover 98.05% of the universe of electronic vot-
ing machines used in the electoral event. Four inde-
pendent sources of information as far as transmis-
sions through wire and cellular telephony were used:
Two of the sources correspond to RADIUS logs, for
wire and cellular transmissions respectively, contain-
ing information on several technological variables for
individual voting machines, among them: amount
of octets (bytes) of incoming and outgoing data to
CNE totalizing servers, start and stop connection
times to CNE totalizing servers, amount of pack-
ets of incoming and outgoing data, identification of
users, hosts and routers, etc. The third and fourth
sources are based on a report draft made by the
wire telephone company to the CNE and the actual
automated tallies printed by machines respectively.
These reports served to cross-check information with
the RADIUS logs to offer validity to the same logs
as reliable sources of information as far as volume
of transmitted data, connection times and duration
of sessions by machine.
In the present article the forensic analysis consists
first in studying the behavior of machines according
to volume of data transmitted and received, and re-
lating it to the vote totals counted electronically and
transmitted by each voting machine. Second, a com-
plementary statistical study is performed that puts
emphasis only on the heterogeneity of the behavior
of groups of machines found in the first analysis that
allowed a classification according to transmissions to
CNE totalizing servers. Directionality of data trans-
mission is not relevant in this part since the statis-
tical analysis is not affected by it.
According to electoral norms, all machines had to
transmit vote totals scrutinized by the same ma-
chine. Also, the information transmitted must in-
clude polling station code numbers, poll’s closing
time, number of registered voters, number of votes
and vote totals results. This information had to be
contained also in paper reports produced by the ma-
chine. Furthermore, the amount of bytes needed to
transmit the data should have been exactly the same
for all machines in the country, regardless of geo-
graphical location and any other differences such as
polling center’s codes or voting volume at the cen-
ter. Also, the software for recording votes, counting
and transmitting results should be the same for all
machines employed. The electronic information on
tallies had a fixed length in bytes. Thus, any dispar-
ity in volume of data transmitted, not accounted for
ordinary transmission errors as eventual lost pack-
ets of data, is unexpected given the electoral stan-
dards. Even more surprising is to find a linear de-
pendence of transmitted data bytes on individual
ballots for a high percentage of machines. This fact
will be our concern. Furthermore, given the elec-
toral normative, when a call session is established
between the totalizing server and a machine at the
closure of polls, only data relating to authentication,
authorization and acknowledgment of reception of
data should be sent to the machine. This amounts
to a fixed volume of data, smaller in size than the
one related to vote results sent by the machine. But
the findings contradict these expectations.
In this analysis, the electronic voting machines
were classified according to the amount of data units
in bytes that were sent from machines to CNE total-
izing servers (Outgoing Data) and according to the
amount of data received by voting machines from
totalizing servers CNE (Incoming Data). For this
study only the data transmissions of the last suc-
cessful connection between machines and CNE to-
talizing servers were taken into account. We suppose
a priori that when several calls were made from the
same machine it was due to defective transmissions,
that is the reason why the last connection is pre-
sumed to be the successful one and that the amount
of data transmitted in both directions in that oc-
casion was the expected information according to
the programmed procedure. Machines communicat-
ing more than once amounted to less than 15% of
the total.
We find that the electronic voting machines fall
into three groups: High Traffic (A) for wire transmis-
sion machines if the number of outgoing bytes added
to incoming bytes surpasses 23 thousand bytes, Low
Traffic (B) for wire transmission machines with to-
tal data traffic lower than 7.5 thousand bytes and
machines communicating via cellular telephony (C).
Differences on volume of data transmitted and re-
ceived are accompanied by differences in number of
packets of data and causes of termination of ses-
sions. In fact, group A has transmissions with the
same number of packets being received and sent
(symmetric transmission) with call terminated by
totalizing servers. Group B has few packets sent
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but many received (asymmetrical transmission) and
calls terminated by machines. For detailed informa-
tion on network platforms, protocols used and more
see Malpica, Velasco and Martin [1].
The voting centers, at the same time, were equally
classified as High Traffic centers (A), Low Traffic
and Cellular ones, (B) and (C) respectively, accord-
ing to whether voting machines in a center fell into
the three groups mentioned above. In the case of ex-
isting mixed wire and cellular transmissions in a cen-
ter, the classification was made according to the
highest number of machines of a particular type A,
B or C, in general the number of mixed centers in
each category A and B is less than 10% of the total.
There were no voting centers with mixed High (A)
and Low (B) Traffic machines. In general, voting
centers could have from 1 to 18 machines grouped
in electoral tables, which could in turn accommodate
from 1 to 3 voting machines. The typical voting cen-
ter housed 4 machines. In the Venezuelan electoral
system, voting centers are arranged into parishes,
the latter into municipalities and several municipali-
ties make a state. Venezuela is divided into 24 states.
The rest of this manuscript is organized as fol-
lows. We first explore the characteristics of the three
groups A, B and C of voting machines comparing
the volume of data in bytes transmitted from and
toward the totalizing CNE servers relative to the
number of votes cast in each machine as reported
by CNE. Indeed, the classification on the basis of
empirical observation of differences in the pattern
of graphs is justified. The results from these ex-
ploratory analyses are presented in Section 2.1. We
then investigate whether voting centers classified as
A, B or C exhibit different distributions of the fol-
lowing variables:
• The percentage of abstentions per machine na-
tionwide.
• The percentage of NO votes per machine nation-
wide.
• The percentage of NO votes per voting center,
compared to what was observed during the pres-
idential elections of 1998 and 2000.
All of these results are presented in Section 2.2. Fi-
nally, some brief conclusions are offered in Section 3.
2. RESULTS
The electronic voting machines transmitted via
wire, mobile and satellite telephony. The machines
transmitting via wire telephony fall into two groups,
High Traffic (A) and Low Traffic (B), according to
whether the amount of data received plus the amount
of data sent is in the range of 23,000 to 63,000 bytes
for the High Traffic class and from 1,500 to 7,500
bytes in the Low Traffic class. When the electoral
variables by region are studied, it will be corrobo-
rated that the classification of High and Low Traffic
is bound to the telephone area codes. We find whole
municipalities in regional states whose voting ma-
chines fall in one or another category. The group of
machines that transmitted via cellular is not much
different to the wire High Traffic group as far as the
pattern of Bytes vs. Votes is concerned and the vol-
ume of bytes transmitted but, technologically, they
are not comparable to the wire telephony. That is
the reason why it is included in this study as a sep-
arate group. In the present analysis machines that
have communicated via satellite are not mentioned
for lack of data.
The classification of High, Low Traffic and Cellu-
lar for voting centers corresponds to those centers
where most of their machines classified in some of
the mentioned classes. It is possible to find around
8% to 9% of machines that communicated via cel-
lular in some of the High and Low Traffic centers;
this could be justified by transmissions failures of
wire telephony or for a way to speed up the process
of data transmission when few wire lines were avail-
able. There are no centers where machines transmit-
ted in both High Traffic and Low Traffic groups. The
inclusion of cellular transmissions with High or Low
Traffic wire transmissions responds to the fact that
analyzed electoral variables do not vary significantly
among machines in the same center.
Thus, 4,421 voting centers are grouped in 1,876
High Traffic centers housing 8,185 voting machines
including cellular machines, 1,573 Low Traffic cen-
ters with 7,383 machines including cellular transmis-
sions and 972 Cellular centers having 3,124 machines
with the exception of 17 machines that fall into the
category of High Traffic wire telephony. The total
number of voting machines in this study is 18,692,
corresponding to 98.05% of the 19,064 voting ma-
chines officially used in the 2004 PRR and for which
registries are known through electronic tally reports.
Table 1 shows the number of machines and centers
with transmission via wire and cellular telephony ac-
cording to the volume of traffic, and, also, the num-
ber of entered effective votes in each category from
a universe of 8,505,867 automated votes in the 2004
PRR according to electronic tally reports.
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Table 1
High Traffic—wire Low Traffic—wire Cellular (C) Total
(A) (B)
Voting centers 1,876 1,573 972 4,421
Number of voting
machines in centers 8,185∗ 7,383∗ 3,124∗∗ 18,692†
Number of machines
in each class 7,535 6,702 4,455 18,692†
Numbers of votes 3,695,415 3,300,896 1,357,733 8,354,044††
and % of total (43.44%) (38.80%) (15.96%)
∗Includes voting machines with cellular transmission.
∗∗Includes voting machines with High Traffic transmission (0.5%).
†Represents 98.05% of automated 2004 PRR.
††Represents 98.20% of automated 2004 PRR.
2.1 Incoming and Outgoing Data versus Votes
between Electronic Voting Machines and
CNE Totalizing Servers
For each group of machines, technological and elec-
toral variables are represented in an x–y plane. The
number of total votes by machine reported by offi-
cial reports is in the x-axis and the amount of bytes
in the data that left and came into the machines
during the transmission is in the y-axis. The points
on the plane represent individual machines that re-
ported a determined number of total votes, and the
data in bytes they emitted to transmit the voting
results to CNE totalizing servers (Outgoing data),
as well as the data received by the machine from
CNE totalizing servers during the established ses-
sions of communication (Incoming data). (See Fig-
ures 1–3.)
A strong correlation between bytes in the incom-
ing data being transmitted and the amount of votes
per machine is observed in High Traffic and Cel-
lular groups of machines (groups A and C). But
the behavior of the Low Traffic group of machines
(group B) is totally different. A linear relation be-
tween number of votes and bytes in the transmitted
data may be observed only by a small number of
machines framed by a high dispersion of points.
Outgoing data transmissions, on the other hand,
show clusters of points with small correlation to the
number of votes in groups A and C, but no correla-
tion exists for the horizontal plot on the Low Traffic
group.
2.1.1 A—High Traffic transmissions Within the
High Traffic group, it is possible to observe two clear-
ly differentiated clusters in the Outgoing data graph,
Fig. 1. Graphs of amount of bytes in data emitted and received by each machine versus number of total votes per machine
for the group of High Traffic transmission. In the Outgoing data graph representing a sample of 6,579 machines, it is possible
to differentiate two subgroups of machines related to two clusters: one superior cloud (G2 with 2,166 machines) and another
inferior cloud (G1 with 4,413 machines).
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Fig. 2. Graphs of amount of bytes in data emitted and received by each machine versus number of total votes by machine in
2004 PRR for the group of machines with Low Traffic transmission.
one that we will call the G1 subgroup and the other
the G2 subgroup. These subgroups correspond to
points falling into the various parallel straight lines
that gather in the Incoming data graph. Subgroup
G1 in the Outgoing graph is related to the lower
straight lines in the Incoming graph.
The perception of a greater dispersion of points
shown in the Outgoing data graph compared to the
one in the Incoming data graph is due to differ-
ent scales involved in the volume of data sizes in
both graphs. Dispersion in graphs as well as various
straight parallel lines in the Incoming data graph
may be related to retransmission of packets of data
lost during transmission. One should expect that the
higher the number of packets of data to be transmit-
ted the higher would be the possibility of losing some
of them during transmission, so they are retransmit-
ted and the number of bytes required for sending the
same information should increase. Since the number
of bytes in packets would differ, retransmission could
produce a random dispersion pattern. Also, some
dispersion could be pointing to a mismatch between
the number of votes reported by the electronic ma-
chines and the actual number of votes transmitted
by machines to totalizing servers. This inference re-
lies on the presumption that any difference on data
transmission bytes among machines could only be
related to the amount of votes being reported since
the rest of the information sent from machines had
a fixed amount of bytes assigned in the memory by
the software according to electoral norms. Parallel
lines in graphs may also be produced when more
packets of data are transmitted intentionally.
In order to determine a typical value of the rela-
tions between incoming and outgoing bytes in High
Traffic machines with the reported votes by ma-
chine, a sample of machines that fall on the lowest
straight line with the largest number of points of
the Incoming data graph of Figure 1 was taken ran-
domly. In the Outgoing data graph, these machines
Fig. 3. Graphs of amount of bytes in data emitted and received by each machine versus number of total votes by machine in
2004 PRR for the cellular transmission group of machines.
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Fig. 4. Graphs of amount of bytes in data emitted and received by each machine versus number of total votes per machine
for a High Traffic machines sample extracted from the lowest straight line shown in Figure 1. The straight lines show lines of
regression with a slope of 47.11 bytes by vote for Incoming data with a 0.2% error and 1.28 bytes by vote for Outgoing data
with 6.0% error in the same machines.
are in subgroup G1. Then, regressions for Incoming
data bytes with respect to votes by machine as well
as Outgoing data bytes against votes by machine
of the same selected machines were calculated. The
graphs for the selected sample regressions are in Fig-
ure 4. The linear regressions show a relation between
bytes and votes given by the following equations:
Incoming data bytes
= 5606 (±52) + 47.11 (±0.14) Votes,
Outgoing data bytes
= 5498 (±30) + 1.28 (±0.08) Votes.
Segregating the High Traffic machines into the
above mentioned subgroups, corresponding to the
superior cluster (G2) and the inferior cluster (G1)
in the Outgoing data graph, it is possible to cor-
roborate that the average of received data bytes by
machines in the inferior cloud (G1) is around 27,000
bytes and the one on the superior cloud is of 37,000
bytes, whereas the average in the emitted data is
around 6,200 bytes in the first case and of 6,700
bytes in the second one. It is found that these two
dissimilar behaviors are simultaneously occurring in
machines of the same electoral table in the same vot-
ing center for a high number of voting centers. Of
the 1,876 High Traffic centers studied, 1,051 centers
(56%) correspond to the category of mixed tables,
663 centers (35%) with all machines in the inferior
cloud and 162 (9%) in the superior one. It is neces-
sary to notice that the majority of these machines
only connected once with the totalizing servers from
which it is deduced that the connections were unique
and successful.
Proportions 56 : 35 : 9 for centers with mixed sub-
groups, inferior and superior subgroup machines re-
spectively, may be considered as originating from
a random sample of the universe of High Traffic cen-
ters if the probability of occurrence of a machine
with traffic in the superior subgroup is 0.33 and for
the inferior one is of 0.67 which are the ratios shown
by the subgroups to the universe of 6,579 machines
(2,166 in superior cloud and 4,413 in the inferior
one).
It follows that machines located in the same elec-
toral table using presumably the same source code,
the same telephone area codes, sometimes the same
telephone line and local networks with the same
technology, similar electoral populations and with
similar physical conditions behaved in such a differ-
ent manner in both the reception and emission of
data, even though the relations of bytes to vote re-
mained more or less the same. The distributions of
votes by machine in both groups differ in average
in 10 votes per machine, being greater in the supe-
rior subgroup. Nevertheless, there are no statistical
differences in the average of percentage of YES and
NO votes reported by automated reports.
It is difficult to technologically explain a behavior
so systematically different in the emitted and recei-
ved data in High Traffic voting machines located in
the same electoral table of the same polling center.
2.1.2 B—Low Traffic transmissions In the Low
Traffic group in wire telephony there is no relation
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between the volume of Outgoing data and the num-
ber of votes computed in each machine, suggesting
the information transmitted was homogeneous for
the machines of this sector. Practically no disper-
sion is shown in comparison with the behavior in
the High Traffic group. This behavior corresponds
more to the expected one when only the informa-
tion on vote totals is transmitted and there are no
packets retransmitted.
On the other hand, the Incoming data of vot-
ing machines show a regular pattern that depends
on the number of votes in the machines only in
a small sector. 27.5% of the machines are in the
vertical segments of the graph related somehow to
number of votes. But the rest of the machines in
the horizontal cluster do not show any relation be-
tween Incoming data bytes to transmitted votes.
This graph also shows a great deal of dispersion. In
general, machines in the same electoral table could
be located in any one of the two mentioned sec-
tors.
The pattern of Incoming data versus votes in the
Low Traffic machines does not seem to respond to
the model of individual vote transmission, as it is
the case for the High Traffic group. Nevertheless,
those machines whose Incoming data bytes are cor-
related with votes do so in a nonhomogeneous way,
the proportional relations between bytes and votes
go from 41 to 46 bytes per vote; these proportions
are comparable in magnitude to those observed in
the High Traffic group but only among machines
that differ approximately in 30 votes.
Once again, it can not be technologically explained
that machines in the same electoral table have be-
haviors so differentiated in bytes transmissions; some
of them are in the vertical segments of the graph and
other ones are in the cluster base.
2.1.3 C—Cellular transmissions In the Cellular
transmissions machines (group C), there is a strong
correlation between votes and Incoming data bytes
transmitted, much in the fashion of the High Traffic
group. The same may be said of the Outgoing data
bytes against number of votes in each machine. To il-
lustrate behavior in this group (Figure 5), a particu-
lar voting center where transmissions from machines
were all through cellular telephony is chosen. This
voting center was located in a municipality where
the majority of centers fell into the group of Low
Traffic transmissions.
The regressions are as follows:
Incoming data bytes
= 8461 (±246) + 53.25 (±0.51) Votes,
Outgoing data bytes
= 6304 (±188) + 1.28 (±0.39) Votes.
It is observed that the slopes of straight lines cor-
respond to 53 bytes per vote for the Incoming data
versus votes relations and of 1.28 bytes per vote in
the slope for Outgoing data versus votes with er-
rors indicating the degree of dispersion. The pattern
shown indicates transmission of individual votes as
in the case of the High Traffic group. Differences in
the volume of data transmission compared to the
High Traffic wire telephony are due to differences in
transmission technology with data bytes measure-
ments made at different levels.
Fig. 5. Graphs of amount of bytes in data emitted and received by each machine versus number of total votes per machine for
14 voting machines transmitting via cellular telephony in the Colegio Internacional de Caracas located in Baruta municipality.
The straight lines show lines of regression with a slope of 53.25 bytes by vote for Incoming data with a 0.9% error and 1.28
bytes by vote for Outgoing data with 30% error in the same machines.
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2.1.4 General results in transmissions The pre-
ceding discussions suggest that either the program-
ming of electronic voting machines for data trans-
mission or the programming in the CNE totalizing
servers to handle data transmissions to machines be-
haved in different ways for two sets of groups of
machines, groups A and C compared to group B.
Although the transmissions through cellular tele-
phony would not be comparable with that of wire
telephony because of differences in technology, the
remarkable differences in the volume of data and
patterns of transmission between the groups of High
and Low Traffic machines in wire telephony cannot
be satisfactorily explained under the electoral rules.
Electoral rules required that each machine should
do the counting of recorded votes and then its results
be transmitted to the totalizing servers. That is, tal-
lies and not individual votes should be transmit-
ted. Transmission of tallies required a fixed amount
of bytes per machine, the same is true for the au-
thorizing, acknowledgement answers and transmis-
sion certificates sent from totalizing servers to ma-
chines; in these cases horizontal straight lines should
be expected in Incoming and Outgoing data graphs
against votes per machine, with perhaps some vari-
ability in the number of bytes mainly for Outgoing
data.
Therefore, the dependence of the amount of data
bytes on the number of votes is inexplicable un-
der the premise of vote totals transmissions, which
was supposed to be the electoral normative. In fact,
graphs show clearly a pattern for transmission of in-
dividual votes in both directions to and from totaliz-
ing servers for the High Traffic and Cellular groups.
Also, if the programming software in the machines
was the same for all machines, one does not under-
stand either the differences in the types of linear
relations with the number of votes reported in ev-
ery voting machine, or the volumes of data reported
in logs since the transmitted information must have
equivalent sizes in all wire telephony cases.
On the other hand, a systematic behavior in the
transmissions going from machines to servers and
also from servers to machines might suggest a pro-
grammed intentionality.
Other findings are also consistent with the sugges-
tion of intentional tampering with the vote count-
ing and transmission process. The irregular distri-
bution of groups of machines, mainly in wire tele-
phony, in different parishes and municipalities with
no overlapping, cannot be explained reasonably by
random technological causes. If the difference in vol-
umes of traffic in wire telephony is due to a tech-
nological variable, then it would be difficult to un-
derstand why the Aragua state in its totality be-
haves technologically different to nearby states like
Carabobo and Miranda that share the same tele-
phone network. The same occurs between contigu-
ous parishes in the same municipality in Carabobo,
Miranda, Merida and Trujillo. A map with occur-
rences of A, B and C machine groups by munici-
palities is shown in Figure 6 (Data transmission in
municipalities and states).
2.2 Empirical Distributions of Electoral Variables
Across the Three Groups of Voting
Machines and Centers
In what follows differences and similarities between
distributions of several variables for the three groups
of voting machines and centers are studied statisti-
cally. The reason to carry out this additional anal-
ysis is to shed light on the incidence of the differ-
entiation in the voting machines transmissions on
electoral results or vice versa.
A priori we could infer that groups A, B and C
of the machines would show differences in electoral
variables like abstention and vote results because the
number of urban voters is higher in group B than in
other groups, as we could gather from the geograph-
ical distribution of groups of machines. In fact, we
should find that the three groups are not random
samples of an electoral universe. But then if there
was intentional tampering with the votes, the group-
ing of the machines and centers must be somehow
associated with electoral results since there seem
to be no technological factors that can explain the
groups. On the other hand, if there was an inno-
cent reason for loading two different software pack-
ages in either machines or servers, the electoral au-
thorities should have mentioned this fact prior to
the election. Suspicions arise mainly because vot-
ing machines were connected to totalizing servers
at CNE headquarters, before tallies were printed by
machines locally. Even more, previously planned au-
dits were not fully carried out and ballot boxes with
paper tickets produced by the machines were not
allowed to be opened.
In this light, a question of interest is the following:
is the linear dependence of Outgoing and Incoming
data bytes on votes related to virtual votes and tam-
pering of electoral results? If that was the case for
groups A and C, what happened to group B where
the linear dependence shows only for 27.5% of the
machines?
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Fig. 6. Data transmission in municipalities and states. The map shows Venezuela divided by municipalities with some States
marked. Full light gray color municipalities include High Traffic wire and Cellular transmissions. Striped gray color regions
refer to municipalities containing some parishes with Low Traffic transmissions. The dark gray color municipalities are regions
with a majority of Low Traffic transmissions mixed with small percentages of Cellular ones.
If vote results were tampered with, it seems logical
to think that the made-up voting patterns were not
made up during the electoral event but, rather, were
determined in advance of the election. If so, an ap-
proach to generate plausible distributions of NO and
YES votes across the various voting centers would
be to mimic what was observed during the 1998
and 2000 presidential elections. Thus, we explore
the similarities and the differences between the elec-
toral results reported for the 2004 PRR and those
that were obtained during the presidential elections
of 1998 and 2000. Clearly, we cannot expect to ar-
rive at any conclusive results, but these comparisons
may help explain how, if at all, electoral results were
altered in 2004.
2.2.1 Percentage of NO votes per machine at the
national level The comparisons of percentiles, means
and medians for the empirical distributions along
with the Van der Waerden test for means are perfor-
med. Also, when two distributions show close enough
means or medians an analysis of variance is included
with its t-test to look at the source of differences.
From previous graphs and numerical tables it is
deduced that the empirical distributions for NO%
per machine in groups A and C are equivalent as
much in the functional form as in their main quan-
tiles, see Figure 7. An analysis of variance test com-
paring means shows there is not statistical difference
between groups A and C with p= 0.4008 (p > 0.05).
Their respective means are 62.0384 ± 0.1657 and
62.3028± 0.2675.
The B (Low Traffic) distribution has a Mean and
Median significantly different from those of groups
A and C; these differences go up to around 10 points
(20%). These results together with the irregular dis-
tributions of types of machines in municipalities and
parishes aim at considering that High and Low Traf-
fic groups of machines cannot be considered rep-
resentative samples of the electoral universe as ex-
pected. But the Cellular group not expected to pro-
duce electoral results similar to either High or Low
traffic groups because of its geographical distribu-
tion is not statistically different to the High Traffic
group, coinciding with the fact that both share the
same pattern of transmission.
The classification of these groups by volume of
data transmissions where the High Traffic and Cel-
lular groups share a pattern quite different to the
Low Traffic one looks like having influence into the
percentage of NO votes per machine.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of distributions of NO Percentage per machine across High, Low Traffic and Cellular groups through box
plots. The short horizontal straight lines indicate the position of the means of distributions and standard deviations, the long
horizontal straight lines indicate the position of the percentiles (10%, 25%, median, 75% and 90%) of the distribution, and the
boxes width shows the relative size of the samples in High, Low Traffic of wire and Cellular telephony. On the right-hand side
Q–Q plots are shown for the three empirical distributions showing variances (slopes) for each distribution.
2.2.2 A comparison to presidential elections of
1998 and 2000 by voting centers classified in
groups A, B and C The next percentage of absten-
tion and empirical distributions for percentage re-
sult in various elections for Chavez 1998, Chavez
2000 and NO 2004 PRR per voting center are sta-
tistically analyzed. Here we aim to consider the his-
torical electoral evolution of the centers; we want to
know how different were those centers in the past
compared to the 2004 event, as well as how different
were their vote results among groups of centers.
In order to be able to compare the 1998 and 2000
elections with the 2004 PRR event, the percentage
of Chavez votes in 1998, 2000 and those of NO in
the 2004 PRR are calculated for each voting center
and for the same centers. This procedure is needed
since the structure of electoral tables was different
for those elections. Also, there was a drastic increase
of 32.6% in the number of voters between the 2000
and the 2004 electoral events.
Voting centers are classified as the High Traffic
group (A) representing 42% of the universe consid-
ered in this study, the Low Traffic group (B) with
36% and the Cellular group (C) with 22%. Each
group contains 44%, 39% and 17% of A, B and C
types of machines respectively. Electoral data are
taken from the official results published by the CNE.
In Table 1 the relations between groups of voting
centers are detailed.
Comparisons of means and standard deviations of
percentage of abstention in each voting center for
the 1998, 2000 and 2004 electoral events and their
differences between successive events for groups A,
B and C are shown in Figure 8.
The number of voting centers analyzed in this sec-
tion is of 4074: 1759 of them correspond to centers
that in 2004 were classified in the High Traffic group,
1492 in the Low Traffic group and 823 in the Cellular
one.
In Figure 8 the most striking finding is that differ-
ences in percentage of abstention by voting center
between the 2000 and 2004 electoral events across
groups A, B and C are statistically the same with
p = 0.4275, when the same measurements between
1998 and 2000 are different for different groups. In
1998 High and Low Traffic groups showed means of
abstention per center slightly different being lower
in the latter group. As pointed out before, in this
group the number of urban voters is higher; tradi-
tionally in Venezuela voters in cities tend to par-
ticipate more in elections than rural ones. Group C
behaved quite different compared to the others more
in line with a rural behavior. By 2000, the B group
showed a small difference with the other two groups;
abstention increased more in this group than in the
others presumably because there were less Chavez
supporters in it, added to the fact that the 2000
event was a presidential re-election after a change of
Constitution and just one year and a half of Chavez
being elected with high popularity. But what is un-
expected is that the difference with the other groups
was maintained in 2004 for a Presidential Recall
Referendum summoned by voters concentrating in
greater numbers precisely in group B. It was ex-
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Fig. 8. Means and differences of % abstention for High, Low Traffic and Cellular groups of voting centers in 1998, 2000 and
2004 electoral events.
Table 2
Means, standard deviations and quantiles for percentage
of NO votes per machine
Level Number Mean Std dev 25%—Q Median 75%—Q
A—High
Traffic—wire 8,205 62.0384 14.6481 53.0 63.51 72.47
B—Low
Traffic—wire 7,431 51.8259 19.2504 40.23 54.65 66.59
C—Cellular 3,150 62.3028 15.9224 52.45 63.94 74.54
pected that abstention would be lower than in
groups A and C, even lower than the one experi-
enced in 1998.
Tables 2–7 for means, standard deviations and dif-
ferences in % of abstention across groups of voting
centers are shown below.
Comparisons of percentages of Chavez votes dis-
tributions in 1998, 2000 and the 2004 NO votes for
the High Traffic and Low Traffic groups are shown
in Figures 9 and 10 as to visualize similarities in
all quantiles between the 2004 PRR and the 2000
presidential election. Tables with means, standard
deviations and quantiles for all groups in the three
electoral events are also included below.
From Figures 9 and 10, it can be perceived that
these groups show different empirical distributions
in their parameters for the three considered elec-
tions. The distributions of votes percentages in High
Table 3
Means, standard deviations of % abstention per voting center
for groups A, B and C
Level Number Mean Std dev
A—HighTraffic—1998 1,759 35.69 6.23
B—LowTraffic—1998 1,492 35.05 7.83
C—CellTraffic—1998 823 38.32 8.99
A—HighTraffic—2000 1,759 42.43 6.70
B—LowTraffic—2000 1,492 43.94 8.25
C—CellTraffic—2000 823 42.99 8.63
A—HighTraffic—2004 1,759 28.35 5.45
B—LowTraffic—2004 1,492 29.71 6.34
C—CellTraffic—2004 823 28.41 6.16
Traffic centers are similar for the 2000 and 2004 elec-
toral events but different from the one in 1998. The
analysis of variance shows that the means of High
Traffic group distributions for the 2000 and the 2004
electoral events are not statistically different with
p = 0.0524 when percentages of Chavez votes are
taken with respect to total votes, that is, null votes
are included. When only valid votes are considered,
means differ but quantiles above median are almost
the same for 2000 and 2004 elections as shown in
Figure 9.
There are differences in means in centers clas-
sified in the Low Traffic group for the 2000–2004
years. But, comparing quantiles, we could appre-
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Table 4
Means, standard deviations for differences in % abstention
per center between 2000 and 2004 events
Level Number Mean Std dev
A—HighTraffic 1,759 14.09 5.44
B—LowTraffic 1,492 14.23 6.19
C—CellTraffic 823 14.58 7.12
Table 5
Means, standard deviations and quantiles for
High Traffic centers
Level Number Mean Std dev 25%—Q Median 75%—Q
1998 1,759 58.36 9.90 51.92 58.4 65.27
2000 1,759 64.11 13.1 55.76 64.83 73.13
NO—2004 1,759 62.25 14.25 53.15 63.95 72.41
Table 6
Means, standard deviations and quantiles for
Low Traffic centers
Level Number Mean Std dev 25%—Q Median 75%—Q
1998 1492 51.62 13.84 43.65 53.94 62.10
2000 1492 54.55 18.53 43.34 57.78 68.71
NO—2004 1492 51.81 19.11 40.61 54.42 66.29
ciate a nearly constant shift along the entire dis-
tribution, a fact that seems surprising. It is found
that 2004 NO% PRR in the Low Traffic centers have
a mean statistically comparable to the mean in the
1998 election with p= 0.7535.
Also, it is interesting to observe that the Cellular
group and the Low Traffic group show similar sta-
tistical behavior in 1998 but in 2000 and 2004 are
quite different. The Cellular group resembles more
the High Traffic group in 2004.
Table 7
Means, standard deviations and quantiles for Cellular centers
Level Number Mean Std dev 25%—Q Median 75%—Q
1998 823 51.46 11.80 43.36 51.00 60.19
2000 827 60.39 13.38 52.20 60.62 69.80
NO—2004 827 61.80 15.39 52.57 63.33 73.69
It is worth noticing that the 1998, 2000 and 2004
elections should be different from a statistical point
of view, since in the first one every voter had to
choose from 5 or more options, the second one from
a maximum of 4 options and in the Recall Refer-
endum choice was only among 2 options in the au-
tomated centers. The differences in the number of
options would have to affect the range of votes per-
centages obtained, thus, the smaller the number of
options is the greater the range of votes percent-
ages would be. Although this is observed for the
ranges of percentages obtained in the 4074 centers
in the 1998, 2000 and 2004 elections (76.42 points),
(86.73 points) and (91.08), respectively, when the
mentioned centers are classified into the A, B and C
groups, group B shows a contraction in the range if
the 2000 and the 2004 electoral events are compared.
Also, if the standard deviations for each group are
historically compared, an increase is observed from
1998 to the 2004 event, nevertheless, the increase
from the 2000 to the 2004 PRR is significantly smaller
in group B.
2.2.3 Chi test of comparison of empirical distri-
butions of Chavez’ votes percentages for 1998, 2000
elections and 2004 PRR As it becomes clear in ex-
amining the graphs above, there are similarities be-
tween the 2004 PRR and the 2000 elections for au-
tomated voting centers in all groups. So, it proceeds
Fig. 9. Chavez% votes with respect to valid votes only for 2004 High Traffic centers (A) in 1998, 2000 and NO% PRR.
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Fig. 10. Chavez% votes for 2004 Low Traffic centers (B) in 1998, 2000 and NO% PRR.
to apply statistical tests for comparison of the en-
tire distributions. In this case, the Chi test is used
to examine the degree of dependence of data be-
tween the 2004 NO% empirical distribution and the
2000 Chavez% distribution. By comparison and rea-
sons of completeness, the Chavez% vote in the 1998
elections for the same voting centers are included as
well. Results are shown in Table 8.
Comparisons are made between the empirical per-
centage distributions in the case when only total
valid votes are considered and also, when null votes
are included. It occurs for the 1998 and 2000 elec-
tions, the 2004 PRR did not have the null option.
It is remarkable that although there was 1 year
and 7 months of difference between the 1998 and
2000 electoral events, Chi test of comparison be-
tween the corresponding empirical distributions show
that they were completely independent events. Nev-
ertheless, the %NO in 2004 PRR cannot be con-
sidered totally independent of the %Chavez votes
in the 2000 elections for the High Traffic group (p=
0.0447), although the first one was an election of two
options and the second one had four options. There
exist differences in the Low Traffic group when per-
centages are computed using valid votes only, but
when null votes are included similarities (p= 0.0402)
resemble those of the High Traffic and Cellular groups
(p= 0.0532).
Something to notice is that the population of vot-
ers increased significantly, 32.6%, for the 2004 elec-
toral event, but those new voters do not have to
behave from the electoral point of view in the same
manner as the population of the 2000 election. There
are more similarities between the NO% 2004 PRR
High Traffic and Cellular groups with the %Chavez
2000 distributions than with the NO% 2004 PRR
Low Traffic one. This is unexpected when consider-
ing that most of the new voters are in the former
groups. Is this indicating a virtual copying of 2000
Table 8
High Traffic centers DF 1758 Low Traffic centers DF 1491 Cellular centers DF 832
Distributions ChiSq p ChiSq p ChiSq p
%NO 2004—%Chav 2000
valid votes 1859.99 0.0447 1748.64 3.7E−06 898.92 0.0532
%NO 2004—%Chav 2000
total votes 2257.43 4.7E−15 1587.79 0.0402 1135.43 1.0E−11
%NO 2004—%Chav 1998
valid votes 5227.07 0 4552.21 3.1E−306 3583.14 0
%NO 2004—%Chav 1998
total votes 7810.74 0 5413.84 0 6469.92 0
%NO 2000—%Chav 1998
valid votes 3405.52 6.6E−108 3235.13 1.4E−130 3141.21 2.7E−264
%NO 2000—%Chav 1998
total votes 4167.38 1.9E−196 3810.55 1.2E−202 4450.29 0
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results in the 2004 PRR event or is just a mere co-
incidence?
3. CONCLUSIONS
The programming of electronic voting machines
for data transmission or the programming in the
CNE totalizing servers to handle data transmissions
appears to have been different in two groups of ma-
chines. This difference allowed a classification of ma-
chines into High Traffic and Cellular machines with
one particular pattern of transmissions, and Low
Traffic machines with quite a different pattern. Dif-
ferences in the patterns of transmission across groups
cannot be satisfactorily explained under the elec-
toral rules and technological platforms used. In fact,
they point to two different programs being used ei-
ther in the voting machines, totalizing servers or
both. The presence of a linear dependence of trans-
mitted data bytes on votes in both directions in com-
munications between servers and machines suggests
that individual votes were interchanged in one group
of machines. Nonrandomness in the geographic dis-
tribution of groups A, B and C of machines may
be showing intentionality in the differentiation, sep-
arating municipalities that showed higher concen-
trations of President Chavez supporters in the 2000
election from the rest. Voting machines in these dis-
tricts were administered differently than machines
in the rest of electoral districts.
We argue that the percentage of NO votes per ma-
chine, as well as the percentage of abstentions, ex-
hibit a similar distribution across voting machines
in the High Traffic (A) and Cellular (C) groups;
the distribution of both variables is rather differ-
ent, however, when we consider machines in the Low
Traffic (B) group. The differences in mean percent-
age of NO votes and in the percentage of absten-
tions in machines of group B compared to machines
of groups A and C are statistically significant.
The differences in abstention percentages at the
center level across the A, B and C groups for the
1998, 2000 and 2004 electoral events support the hy-
pothesis of a nonrandom grouping of centers. When
combined with the fact that voting centers of types
A and B tended to be located in different nonover-
lapping parishes within the same municipalities, this
may be taken as an indication that tampering in se-
lected voting centers and selected voting machines
may have taken place.
If indeed tampering occurred, an interesting ques-
tion is whether the 2000 election results may have
been approximately reproduced in 2004 to produce
a plausible distribution of NO and YES votes in var-
ious centers. When we compare the distributions of
each type of vote across the elections of 1998, 2000
and 2004 we find that the hypothesis of a linear
dependence between results observed in 2000 and
those reported for 2004 cannot be rejected. We ob-
serve a constant shift of the relative differences of
abstentions in centers classified as A, B or C be-
tween 2000 and 2004, an unexpected finding.
While we believe that we have put forth persuasive
arguments to question the integrity of the voting
process during the 2004 PRR, our analyses and con-
clusions are limited by the fact that voting machines
were not calibrated prior to the election. Thus, even
though we cannot think of a plausible reason for
the differences that were observed in transmission
volumes, it is possible that factors totally unrelated
to the electoral process may have had an effect on
transmission volumes. For the monitoring and au-
diting system of electronic voting machines to be
fully defensible, it would be necessary to calibrate
the machines ahead of the event, perhaps by trans-
mitting a test file of known size from randomly cho-
sen machines to randomly chosen servers repeatedly
so that the number of bytes used in the transmission
can be compared to the file size.
Deciding whether tampering occurred given the
evidence is akin to deciding between two competing
hypothesis: tampering occurred or tampering did
not occur. This decision problem can be formulated
as a posterior odds problem, where we weigh the
probability of tampering given the evidence against
the probability of no tampering given the same evi-
dence. The latter can be thought of the probability
of a coincidental outcome that occurs for reasons
which have nothing to do with tampering. To com-
pute a posterior odds ratio, we need to be able to
evaluate the probability of observing the electoral
results (and the rest of the evidence) we observed
under the two hypothesis of tampering and no tam-
pering. With the information available to us, we
can think of quantifying the conditional probabil-
ity of the evidence given tampering. But in order
to also quantify the probability of observing what
we observed if no tampering had occurred, we need
information that is not available and that can be
obtained through a careful calibration of the voting
machines.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that after the 2006
elections that took place in Venezuela, the governing
party greatly limited the type and amount of infor-
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mation that would be made available about trans-
missions between voting machines and the CNE ser-
vers. For example, information that was available
for earlier elections including log headers for outgo-
ing and incoming data bytes were missing from the
transmission logs shared with the public. Further,
it is no longer possible to determine the geographic
location of each voting machine. Thus, the analyses
that we were able to carry out using the 2004 elec-
tion data cannot be carried out for the 2006 elec-
tion.
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